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 Free Will and Human Nature: Should We Be Worried? 
Evolutionary Psychology has a bigger problem with free will than it 
acknowledges, argues Brian Garvey 
Edward O. Wilson’s Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, published in 1975, dealt with 
group behaviour within species—co-operation, competition, hierarchy formation, and so 
forth.[1] It focused principally on eusocial insects, such as ants, and primates, and told a 
story about how this behaviour evolves from a gene’s eye view, of the kind familiar from 
the work of Richard Dawkins, Robert Trivers, and others. This might have caused barely 
a flicker of controversy had it not been for the final chapter, wherein Wilson speculated 
on potential implications of his theories for humans. Although he was rather vague and 
circumspect, strident objections erupted almost immediately. And thus began the human 
nature wars, which have raged ever since.[2] 
One of the most frequent complaints against Wilson was that he gave people excuses for 
bad behaviour. Stephen Rose, reviewing Wilson’s On Human Nature,[3] wrote: 
[…] for Wilson human males have a genetic tendency towards polygyny, females towards 
constancy (don’t blame your mates for sleeping around, ladies, it’s not their fault they are 
genetically programmed). 
This accusation has subsequently been levelled against the schools of thought that may 
be said to have taken their cue from Wilson—notably Evolutionary Psychology. But for 
the accusation to stick, it’s not enough that Wilson, or the Evolutionary Psychologists, 
give evolutionary explanations for certain types of behaviour. They can only be giving 
excuses to (for example) men who are serial philanderers if their theories imply that men 
find it very difficult or impossible to stop themselves from serially philandering. 
Evolutionary Psychologists are also frequently accused of presenting speculation as if it 
were fact. If we put this together with the previous complaint, we get: Evolutionary 
Psychologists are giving us, without good evidence, a story that gives excuses to bad 
people. On the other hand, if their theories are well-founded after all, there is a different 
reason to be worried. We generally like to feel that people can be held responsible for 
their actions, and indeed that we are in control of ourselves. It would be bad news if a 
well-founded scientific theory told us that they can’t, or that we aren’t, or at least that we 
are to a significantly lesser extent than we had thought. 
So does Evolutionary Psychology really imply that we have less control over our own 
actions than we might have thought? Janet Radcliffe-Richards argues that it doesn’t, and 
argues this by appealing tocompatibilism about free will.[4] Compatibilism is the doctrine 
that free will can still exist, and that we can still be in control of our actions and morally 
responsible, even if determinism is true. It is not part of my purpose here to decide 
whether compatibilism is true or not. Rather, what I argue is: (1) even if compatibilism is 
true we still might not have free will; (2) there are certain things that, on either 
compatibilist or incompatibilist views, would count as reductions or negations of free will; 
and (3) Evolutionary Psychology, at least in its most prominent version, makes claims 
that if true would mean that we have significantly less self-control and responsibility than 
we might have thought. 
The first point is quite easy to establish. Compatibilism just means that free will, self-
control and responsibility are compatible with determinism. It does not imply that in every 
possible deterministic scenario we have free will, self-control and responsibility. 
Compatibilists would not dispute that if, for example, our behaviour was disconnected 
from our brains and controlled by some diabolical genius, we would not have free will. 
Hence, in order to establish that we have free will, it is not enough to establish the truth of 
compatibilism. We would also have to establish that whatever conditions are needed for 
free will are actually met. This need becomes particularly pressing when we are faced 
with new considerations that seem, on the face of it, to be relevant—as is the case with 
Evolutionary Psychology. I do not attempt here to provide a full account of the conditions 
for free will. Rather, I am attempting the more modest task of showing some of the 
conditions that, if met, would mean that we have less of it than we might have thought. 
On the second point, everyone, compatibilist or incompatibilist, agrees that being tied up 
or imprisoned reduces or negates our freedom. Some might quibble about whether these 
conditions really affect our free will; they might argue that we can continue to will things 
just as we could before. But if the really important issues are responsibility and self-
control, then most people would agree that being tied up or imprisoned means that there 
are things that we can’t do, meaning that we can’t be responsible for not doing them or 
have control over whether we do them. 
But there are other kinds of conditions that, again I think most people would agree, have 
a similar effect. A person in the grip of a severe addiction or phobia will—and this seems 
to be part of the definition of these conditions—find it extremely hard to do certain things 
or stop themselves from doing certain things. One might insist that they are still able to 
do the things, or to refrain from doing the things, and that their condition only makes it 
harder, not impossible. But if we see things in slightly less all-or-nothing terms, it seems 
reasonable to say that a person with an addiction or a phobia ought to be cut some slack, 
because they are less able to control certain actions and should be held less responsible 
for those actions. One might, consistent with this, hold that an addicted person is to 
blame for becoming addicted in the first place. I won’t try to adjudicate that issue here. 
What if it turned out, though, that there are people who have dispositions that develop in 
a way that’s outside their control, and that are similar enough to addictions that they can 
be said to curtail responsibility and self-control in the same way? This possibility, I 
suggest, may justify the worry about Evolutionary Psychology having negative 
implications for responsibility and self-control. 
Finally, on the third point, a defining feature of the most prominent school of Evolutionary 
Psychology—the school represented by Cosmides and Tooby, Steven Pinker, David 
Buss and others[5]—is the massive modularity thesis. This is the thesis that the mind is 
wholly or at least very largely composed of special-purpose mechanisms that operate 
more-or-less autonomously and automatically, as opposed to being a general-purpose 
reasoning or learning machine. In support of this view, they appeal to (i) examples of 
divisions of function—for example, it is possible to lose the ability to recognise faces 
while remaining otherwise visually unimpaired; (ii) an analogy with physical anatomy, with 
the division of the body into well-defined and separate organs; and (iii) a general 
evolutionary argument that natural selection builds solutions to specific problems as they 
arise and doesn’t plan for the future. The important point here is that modules produce 
their outputs automatically and in a way that’s oblivious to other information that the mind 
possesses. This is why optical illusions persist even when we know they are illusions: the 
visual system produces outputs automatically and doesn’t have access to all the 
information that other parts of the mind has. Evolutionary Psychologists argue that 
motivations similarly arise automatically and without regard for other relevant information. 
For example, Donald Symons says: 
Human behavior is flexible, of course, but this flexibility is of means, not ends, and the basic 
experiential goals that motivate human behavior are both inflexible and specific.[6] 
On this account, then, we have desires that arise automatically, and that are inflexible in 
the sense that they continue to be motivators even if our better judgement tells us not to 
follow their promptings. This seems to make us helpless before them in the same way 
that an addict is helpless before their addiction. It is not impossible to resist the desires, 
but their persistent nature will make it hard for us to resist them, and consequently 
reduce our responsibility and self-control in just the way that addictions and phobias do. 
Evolutionary Psychologists sometimes try to allay such concerns by arguing that we have 
an override mechanism. But they give no explanation of how such a mechanism would 
work, or indeed of how it fits with their massive modularity view of the mind. In the 
absence of such an explanation, there are two alternatives facing Evolutionary 
Psychology: either they have an account of motivation that undermines the idea that we 
have full responsibility and self-control, or they have a seriously incomplete account of 
motivation, and hence of the mind generally. 
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